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Donors: should we stay or should we go?   
Many organizations are wondering whether it is 
sensible to invest in anything but humanitarian aid 
under current conditions in South Sudan. But it is  
a vast country, and insecurity can be fragmented 
and localized. Still areas not directly affected by 
violence are at times forgotten by the humanitarian 
community and deemed too risky for development 
assistance. This policy brief argues that those 
areas offer a more conducive environment for 
development engagement, and that the most 
conflict-affected areas can benefit from such 
initiatives too. A positive example is the World 
Food Programme’s sourcing maize from a local 
farmers’ association in Yambio to support starving 
populations elsewhere in the country.1 It is worth 
considering localized developments in their own  
right, and to stimulate local-level innovations that  
may light the way for other areas. Having said that, 
gains made at the local level are vulnerable when  
the national conflict endures, so a political solution  
for that conflict remains essential.
Projects: flexibility and local networks
Elements of insecurity, poverty and rapid change 
have been perpetual qualities of socio-political 
life in this region arguably since before Sudan’s 
independence in 1956. Perhaps unsurprisingly, much 
of the assistance that the South has received and 
continues to receive was humanitarian in nature.  
For the development assistance between 2005  
and 2010, a critical multi-donor evaluation noted  
a heavy focus on socio-economic development  
(i.e. basic service delivery), based on a theory of 
change in which underdevelopment was assumed  
to contribute to conflict directly (Bennett, 2010). 
What is more, donors often had to make a trade- 
off between quick results on the one hand, and  
the sustainability of their efforts on the other  
(eg. through improved capacity building).2 
Development practitioners in South Sudan would 
be wise to take insecurity and change as a premise, 
and construct their engagement accordingly: projects 
are best when they have long-term goals but remain 
flexible and adaptive, and when they stimulate local 
networks that will outlive the timespan of a project.3 
Doing so requires an understanding of local (elite) 
interests in promoting or hindering change. In this 
light, the functioning of local justice systems could 
be supported by fostering constructive connections 
between customary and state judges and the  
local administration. 
 
Land: major source of conflict
Driven by insecurity and drawn by the prospects  
of a more prosperous and peaceful life, many people 
have flocked to the cities of WES.4 The increased 
pressure on land is both a consequence and cause of 
conflict.5 In recent years, efforts by local government 
to formalize land tenure have resulted in increased 
friction within and among communities.6 In Yambio  
a new institution called the County Land Authority 
was set up in 2013 in line with the Land Act (2009).  
It has made important strides in resolving land 
disputes, but the donor funding has phased out 
and local government has not taken over the 
payment of its staff. The institution is thus left 
fragile to inefficiency and corruption. Given the  
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The present is one of the hardest times in the recent history of South Sudan.  
Fragmented violent conflict, a political deadlock and a crippling economic  
crisis are making everyday life extremely difficult. Further, the relations between  
the South Sudanese government and its international partners are at a low.  
Local customary and state justice provision is faced with countless obstacles  
and challenges. Based on socio-legal research in Western Equatoria State (WES),  
this paper highlights dilemmas and lines for debating local-led ways out of the  
quagmire by improving coordination and possibly expanding the jurisdiction  
for customary courts. This brief argues that local developments should be valued  
in their own right, and that regional innovations in more peaceful pockets of  
the country may light the way for other areas. 
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weak institutional context and economic crisis,  
it would be wise if the local government would 
refrain from expropriating citizens through its 
demarcation process as long as it has no budget or 
land to compensate the dispossessed. The literature 
on similar processes warns that tenure formalization 
is often not the most effective way to improve 
citizens’ tenure security, that it rarely benefits 
the poor and powerless, and that the established 
cadastres or registries are often unsustainable.7
Where disputes over land occur between 
members of different ethnic groups, there is  
a real risk of escalation and especially so when 
disputants feel that local authorities are partial.8  
In such instances, inclusive context-specific 
resolutions could be fostered where the elders  
and traditional authorities of the respective 
communities agree on the terms of land use,  
while the county commissioner, police and  
judiciary pledge support for its enforcement.9  
Recent research in Aweil East suggests that  
fruitful modus operandi can be achieved where 
access to grazing land is opened up while arable  
land remains more cautiously governed.10
Women: still behind, but taking action
Despite legislative safeguards the position of 
women in South Sudanese society remains especially 
precarious in many ways. Domestic violence and 
neglect are widespread, women’s aspirations for 
development are often stifled, and various forms 
of gender-based violence are common. Sometimes 
a widow is chased away from the land of her late 
husband by her in-laws, a practice called ‘widow 
chasing.’ When that happens it is not self-evident 
that she is welcomed back by her own family. 
Women’s effective post-divorce rights are meagre 
– especially on custody and property. Their access 
to justice can be obstructed by fear of stigma, cost, 
distance and lack of knowledge. 
Still the situation is not only grim: our research 
found that women initiated between 30 and 44 
percent of the cases in customary courts.11 In some 
cases they followed the appellate chain all the way  
to the high court.12 What is more, substantively things 
are changing and both customary and statutory 
courts were at times willing to recognize women’s 
rights to property and inheritance. The enforcement 
of such rulings is often partial, and the processes  
are hindered by intimidation with violence and witch-
craft. But some powerful women continue to push 
for social change and use the law and court system 
to do so. This research highlights that legislative 
change and improved access to justice are useful, 
but not sufficient to improve the position of women. 
Many laws remain ink on paper in the absence of 
enforcement, and access to courts alone does not 
equate access to justice. The position of outsiders 
promoting normative change in this regard is not 
strong: especially traditional authorities and elders  
are often skeptical of human rights and its advocates. 
 
Customary courts omnipresence and functioning
Customary A, B, and C-courts are present throughout 
the country (Leonardi et al, 2010) and WES (Braak, 
2016). The traditional authorities (TA’s)13 that hear 
cases in these courts as well as outside of them, 
remain the quintessential justice providers for large 
swaths of the population. TA’s tend to stay longer 
when insecurity increases than state judges, and 
they are normally native to the area in which they 
work. The justice they offer is generally affordable, 
accessible (in terms of distance and complexity) and 
swift. Importantly, some TA’s have inherited their title 
and position, but some have also been appointed 
or elected by their community. As a general rule the 
panel of three judges also counts one woman, and  
at times it is mixed ethnically. Decisions of customary 
courts can be appealed to in state courts, but that 
process can be expensive, slow and complicated – 
especially so in areas without state courts. Through 
the Local Government Act (2009) TA’s have been 
incorporated into government, and higher-level ones 
get a small salary from the state.
Customary courts and TA’s come with challenges 
rooted in their lack of capacity (general lack of 
resources, limited knowledge of the law, low levels 
of education), and in the discrepancy between their 
normative beliefs and statutory law (unfavorable 
approach of women, belief in witchcraft, dislike of 
‘human rights’ as a body of norms and the actors  
that promote them). Customary courts sometimes 
hand down rulings that violate both customary and 
statutory norms of fairness, and they can be keen  
to sentence defendants in part because they rely  
on court revenues for their income. But there is a fair  
degree of downward accountability, as unpopular TA’s  
and courts can ‘lose people’: people will simply stop  
bringing their disputes. In other instances, controversial 
TA’s can be fired by the county commissioner.14
The jurisdiction of customary courts is limited  
to civil disputes,15 and they cannot sentence people to 
prison. In reality they often do hear criminal cases and 
sometimes sentence people to prison and/or lashes. 
Litigants bring criminal cases to customary courts 
because the state courts are often not accessible, but 
also because customary courts offer quick, accessible 
and affordable local justice and frequently demand 
compensation for the victims.16 Customary courts are 
faced with a dilemma when disputants bring cases that 
fall outside of their jurisdiction (such as criminal cases):
1) to deal with those disputes; 
2)  to keep suspects in pre-trial detention and  
wait until a state judge arrives; 
3)  to refer disputants to the nearest competent 
court; or 
4) not to deal with those cases at all.
This research has found that the first and second 
strategy are most commonly chosen.17 The first strategy 
is at odds with the law and therefore problematic in 
the eyes of state judges. The second and third strategy 
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align with state legislation most closely, but can  
result in prolonged court cases, insurmountable  
costs for litigants, and sometimes suspects spending 
years in pre-trial detention.18
Faced with the limited capacity of the statutory 
legal system, some donors may choose to invest 
in accessible justice provision by supporting TA’s. 
There seems to be a strong demand among lower-
level TA’s (B-court judges and below) for ‘guidance’ 
on technical competences, jurisdiction, and the link 
with the state. In the past though, donor-supported 
trainings to TA’s were often framed as capacity 
building, but perceived by TA’s to be normatively 
loaded (in favour of human rights). 
 
Statutory courts struggle: decentralization  
risks weakening them
There is a deep and widening gap between the letter 
of the law (both substantive and procedural) and its 
implementation in practice. Rights are disregarded, 
obligations neglected, and jurisdictions overstepped. 
What is more, the legal framework in many instances 
presupposes the presence of countless institutions 
at that have simply not been established. This brief 
argues that the discrepancy between law and practice 
risks further undermining the credibility of the state, 
and that it would be better if legislation and policies 
were realistic and pragmatic. 
The capacity of the state judiciary is limited (e.g. 
lack of trained judges, lack of budgets, insecurity) 
and is likely to remain so for years to come. This 
capacity should be enhanced, but for the short and 
medium term the government and its international 
partners would do good to be pragmatic in improving 
accessible justice – especially for cases that fall out-
side of the jurisdiction of customary courts. Mobile 
courts could be supported to address urgent justice 
needs, but they depend on an enabling environment 
and do not solve systemic problems.19 Local govern-
ment could also organize to transport suspects of 
serious criminal offenses to the nearest competent 
state court. 
It is unclear if the decentralization into 28 states 
will be followed by decentralization of the judiciary, 
but there is a risk that the already limited human and  
financial resources of the state judiciary will be spread 
even more thinly. Legally, each state is to have a High  
Court, and each county a County Court, but practically  
that seems unfeasible. At the time of writing the de-
centralization decree has been partially implemented  
by the executive,20 but not by the judiciary.21
Linking the state and customary courts
State and customary courts are especially weak 
when it comes to the enforcement of their rulings. 
In civil cases the enforcement is left to the litigants 
in question, and in criminal cases the police or prison 
services are entrusted with it. But when we visited 
litigants a full year after their dispute had been 
settled in the high court, we found that disputes 
had often not ended in reality. The losing party was 
sometimes able to ignore the ruling or resist  
it by intimidating the complainant. 
One way of improving the provision of local 
justice and its enforcement, would be through better 
and more flexible coordination between state and 
county governments and customary and statutory 
courts. State legislatures and judiciaries should 
think boldly with TA’s about improving access to 
justice in areas where there are no statutory courts. 
Solutions can vary from something as simple as 
regular phone consultations to more drastic measures 
such as (temporarily) expanding the jurisdiction of 
customary courts to include certain criminal offences. 
If customary courts would be granted criminal 
jurisdiction, it is crucial that the oversight mechanisms 
of the judiciary as well as the appellate chain are 
improved. The Judiciary Act (2008) envisages  
the supervision by the president of every state’s 
High Court of all the judiciary. Presently, many state 
judges do not regard customary courts as part of the 
judiciary proper. Should the presidents of state courts 
be able to overcome their reluctance to engage with 
customary courts, they could help to enhance the 
quality of justice being administered locally as well as 
improve their own understanding of locally relevant 
customary laws. 
Customary court clerks could be key to the 
improved coordination between local administration 
and customary courts. The clerk is responsible for 
keeping the court records and filling forms on court 
revenues. In theory they are to receive a salary 
from the payam or county government, but in our 
research we found that this only happened in the 
state capital Yambio and not in surrounding counties. 
He is often the only person who can read or write, 
and is sometimes asked by court members to read 
provisions of a statutory law. Customary clerks  
could be invited for a state-wide training, designed 
and executed based on a needs assessment and  
in partnership with the high court president and  
a specialist. The training could address the best ways 
of keeping court records and revenue administration, 
and answer questions that clerks may have. This 
would enhance the quality of appeals and oversight 
throughout the judicial chain. As a positive corollary, 
court clerks could thereafter help court members  
to improve procedural justice.
Justice reform is not merely a technical matter,  
it is also very political. This is why all relevant  
local stakeholders (i.e. the county commissioner, 
judges, customary court members, paramount chief, 
legal administrator) should be included in debates  
to design locally feasible and desirable modus 
operandi, based on the opportunities and 
constraints of their particular setting. The central 
and state governments could create legal, and 
ideally financial, space for such local experiments 
in line with the Local Government Act, and perhaps 
establish minimum requirements. Donors could 
facilitate and support capacity building as deemed 
relevant to support such local configurations.
State and customary  
courts are especially  
weak when it comes  
to the enforcement  
of their rulings.
Policy Brief South Sudan Van Vollenhoven Institute Oct 2016
Conclusion
South Sudan is in the midst of turbulent times again, 
and its people, government and supporters are faced 
with countless dilemmas. The present context is  
fragile in every meaning of the word, and program-
ming should always anticipate rapid change: for 
better or worse. This policy brief has opted for an 
unconventional approach: pragmatic idealism in 
which justice reform is first and foremost based on 
an assessment of the realities of justice provision 
on the ground, and in which localized cooperation 
between the customary and state judiciary is seen  
as fundamental to improvement. In South Sudan 
institutional connections are often weak, but per-
sonal connections can be strong. Those connections 
can be harnessed for the advancement of a more 
effective justice system. 
While the national crisis oscillates on the contin-
uum between war and peace, people’s everyday lives 
continue to evolve around the pursuit of happiness. 
The local justice sector is crucial for resolving disputes 
that occur at this level. But it is presently not well-
equipped to handle disputes involving the state or 
armed factions. Therefore, outside actors should think 
critically about the leverage they have to support a 
constructive political settlement that may move the 
country to a more peaceful politics and to eventually 
help make justice at the local level the standard  
rather than a vulnerable exception.  
The full research report is available at:  
http://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/research/
research-projects/law/supporting-primary-
justice-in-insecure-contexts-south-sudan-and-
afghanistan 
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